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Integrated information theory is supposed to be a theory of “the amount 
of consciousness in a system”. When a system’s F-value (a measure of 
“integrated information” in the system) is above 0, the system is con-
scious; and the value of F determines precisely the “amount” of con-
sciousness it has (Tononi and Koch). 
Many have noted that IIT has weird predictions - Scott Aaaronson espe-
cially has pressed this point. For instance, it implies that, if an extremely 
simple 2D grid has a Phi value that is (say) 10 times greater than your 
brain, then this 2D grid has 10 times the “amount” of consciousness that 
you have. 
 I agree that IIT has weird predictions. But if a theory of consciousness 
fits the data and is more elegant than the alternatives, maybe we should 
accept the theory even if it has some weird predictions. After all, some of 
our best physical theories have weird predictions too. 
My central concern about IIT is different. I don’t have a clear grasp on 
what the theory is a theory of. If you look at how IIT is formulated, it is 
not just a theory of when consciousness is present or absent. It is more 
specific; it is a theory of the *amount* of consciousness in an arbitrary 
system. The theory is that the *amount* of consciousness in a system is 
its level of Phi. So, for instance, it implies that, if a 2D grid has a Phi value 
that is (say) 10 times greater than your brain, then this 2D grid has 10 
times the “amount” of consciousness that you have (even when you are 
fully awake and have had your morning coffee). Indeed, it implies that the 
amount of consciousness in such a system is *unbounded* - since its Phi 
level is unbounded.  
 
																																																						
* These remarks appeared in the discussion section of an article by John Horgan at Scientific Amer-
ican (“Consciousness and "Crazyism": Responses to Critique of Integrated Information Theory”, 
December 7, 2015.) More recently, other have raised basically the same problem, namely that talk 
of “levels of consciousness” or “amount of consciousness” has been given no clear meaning (how-
ever they do not use this, as I have done, as an objection to IIT). See Bayne, T., Hohwy, J., & 
Owen, A. M. (2016). “Are There Levels of Consciousness?. Trends in Cognitive Sciences. 20(6), 
405–413. 
  
My worry about this is not Aaaronson’s – namely, that such predictions 
are counterintuitive. Rather, my point is that it is not even clear what 
these predictions mean. What could it even mean to say that a 2D grid 
might have, say, “10 times the amount” of consciousness that you have 
when you are fully awake? My worry is not that this prediction is false; 
rather, I don’t know what this form of words even means, so I cannot evaluate 
for truth or falsity. In general, I don’t yet know what proponents of IIT 
mean by talk of the “amount” of consciousness – a supposedly unbounded 
dimension of our experiences (and indeed one that has a ratio scale, on 
IIT, since Phi has a ratio scale). Since “IIT” is supposed to be a theory of 
the “amount” of consciousness, and since proponents don’t give this term 
a clear meaning, they haven’t really specified a theory yet that can be 
evaluated.  
 
By the “amount” of consciousness in a system, do they mean the number 
of experiences it has? Or the *intensity* of its experiences – so that if you 
turn up the volume on the radio, the “amount” of consciousness you are 
enjoying goes up? I am sure that they mean neither of these things. (They 
would not say, for instance, that the 2D grid has 10 times *the number* 
experiences than you, or that it has auditory experiences that are 10 times 
“louder” than yours, or anything of the sort.) Or do they perhaps mean 
the “amount” of information represented by an experience? But all expe-
riences – even the experience of a blank wall – rule out infinitely many 
possibilities. Finally, by the “amount” of consciousness in a system, do 
they mean something about how much information that is being repre-
sented by conscious experience is being cognitively accessed (so that when 
you just wake up and are inattentive, you count as having a low amount 
of consciousness)? But this can’t be what they mean either. For one thing, 
their view implies that there can be a large amount of consciousness even 
in a system, such as the 2D grid, *where there is no cognitive access at 
all*.  
 
It might be replied that we find it hard to know what “amount of con-
sciousness” means because we are stuck with our own “amount of con-
sciousness”. But this doesn’t really address the problem. I have distin-
guished between different candidate meanings for “amount of conscious-
ness”. The proponent of IIT needs to say which one she means; until then 
her theory just hasn’t been specified – she hasn’t said what the theory is a 
theory of. The problem is that none of the candidates is plausible.  
 
Another, separate problem with IIT, it seems to me, is that proponents 
discussed consciousness at a very abstract level. If we try to get down to 
the details, it is hard how the theory might explain even very rudimentary 
facts about experiences and their phenomenal structure. To take just one 
example: the intensity (perceived loudness) of your experience of one tone 
might be twice greater than your experience of another tone. This is a 
phenomenological fact about your conscious experiences. But, given just 
the resources of IIT (F-value, nodes, cause-effect powers, etc.), it is very 
hard to see what this “doubling” might consist in or be grounded in (F-
value doesn’t double, “cause-effect powers” don’t double!). If the theory 
lacks the resources to explain even this rudimentary phenomenological 
fact – it cannot even offer a candidate explanation – then it really hasn’t 
made it out of the gate, or so it seems to me.   
 
